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Divine favour ( luf, tawfq) is the 
notion that God assists human beings by 
inspiring them to perform good acts and 
to refrain from bad ones and is the sub-
ject of a major theological doctrine pro-
pounded by the Mutazila and contested 
by their adversaries. This form of assis-
tance is one of the two types of guidance 
(hud, hidya) with which God is believed 
to favour humans, the other being instruc-
tion (irshd), provided through the medium 
of prophetic teachings.
The Qurn depicts divine providence 
in a wide variety of ways, most notably 
in terms of the bestowal of sustenance 
(rizq, e.g., Q 2:60; 5:114) and grace ( fal, 
e.g., Q 2:64; 34:10) on humans. God is 
described as being benevolent (laf ) to 
His creatures (e.g., Q 12:101; 22:62; 
42:18); it is from this adjective that the 
Mutazila derived their term of choice, 
luf  , which is said to denote, in ordinary 
language, kindness (rifq) and assistance 
(mana) (Abd al-Jabbr, vol. 13, 9–11). As 
a more narrowly defined theological term, 
luf refers specifically to the assistance by 
which God motivates human beings to 
enhance their moral and soteriological 
standing, as opposed to worldly aspects of 
divine providence.
The Mutazila held almost unanimously 
that the provision of luf is obligatory on 
God, the chief exception being Bishr b. 
al-Mutamir (d. 210/825), an early mem-
ber of the Baghdd current of the school 
(van Ess, TG, 3, 121ff.). As an aspect of 
the Mutazil theory of God’s justice (adl), 
the doctrine of divine favour is secondary 
to the more primary tenets, that goodness 
and badness are real and objective prop-
erties of acts, and as such discernible to 
the mind, and that God is hence obliged, 
as a moral agent, to refrain from bad acts 
and to perform duties. He took on one set 
of providential duties as soon as He cre-
ated human beings, who, as moral agents 
themselves, are subject to certain obliga-
tions of their own (a condition known as 
taklf ), and hence accountable for their 
acts in the hereafter and liable to suffer 
an eternity of punishment in hell or to be 
rewarded in heaven. These divine obliga-
tions towards humans, it is argued, hinge 
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on the notion that God, as beneficent cre-
ator, wills benefit (al) for human beings 
and so must bring about circumstances 
conducive to their attainment of happiness 
and avoidance of misery in the hereafter. 
His first obligation is to provide them 
with the means to fulfil their obligations; 
for instance, intellect, with which they can 
distinguish good and bad acts; volition, 
which enables them to choose freely; and 
the capacity (qudra) to produce their own 
acts (Abd al-Jabbr, 11, 367ff.). A good 
creator, according to the Mutazila, does 
not then leave His creatures to their own 
devices but is obliged to provide them with 
two types of guidance: instructional, which 
takes the form of prophetic teachings, and 
motivational, termed luf. God is required 
to motivate humans to make the right 
choices, because obligations involve hard-
ship (mashaqqa) and are hence inherently 
unattractive choices of action. Although 
agents are motivated by their knowledge 
of the ethical properties of acts to perform 
good acts and refrain from bad ones, they 
also come under the formidable sway of 
“motives of need,” which often urge them 
to act differently. Yet no matter the qual-
ity and quantity of any particular instance 
of assistance that God bestows on an indi-
vidual, it can only make a certain choice 
of action more compelling and likely than 
another; it does not determine it, as that 
would violate the more primary Mutazil 
principle of human free choice (ikhtiyr).
All occurrences intended to motivate 
humans in the manner described consti-
tute instances of divine assistance (often in 
the plural, alf ). None can be intrinsically 
bad; God cannot, for instance, lie in order 
to motivate humans to obey Him. The 
exact nature of the alf depends, to some 
extent, on the recipient’s circumstances 
and can take the form of advantages or 
disadvantages, provisions or deprivations 
(al-Zamakhshar, 67). Some alf are cre-
ated by God, including many cases of 
illness and other forms of suffering and 
hardship, which may serve as lessons or 
ordeals. Others are commanded by God 
but performed by the recipient of the 
assistance, the main example being acts 
of worship enjoined in revelation, which 
serve as reminders. If an instance of luf 
is followed by the agent’s performance of 
a good act, it can be described as “acting 
in accord with God’s favour” (tawfq). If 
followed by refraining from a bad act, it is 
described as “prevention of error” (ima). 
Prophets are infallible (mam), because 
error is prevented in all their acts.
Beyond Mutazilism, the belief in divine 
providence, including God’s day-to-day 
guidance and assistance to believers, is 
central to the popular theology of Muslims 
but nonetheless features as only a minor 
subject in formal theology. Most Sunn 
theologians oppose the Mutazil doctrine 
that God is under ethical obligations and 
therefore understand all forms of assistance 
He provides to His creatures as acts of 
favour, as opposed to duties. Drawing on 
the Qurn (e.g., Q 3:160; 74:31), Ashars 
further maintain that God also forsakes 
(khidhln) some people by motivating them 
to commit bad acts, although this does 
not undermine His goodness, and that the 
assistance God provides does not merely 
affect the likelihood of the choices made 
by the recipients but, in fact, determines 
them. Some, including Ab al-asan 
al-Ashar (d. 324/936), the founder of the 
school, go further, defining lu f and tawf q 
as a capacity (qudra) that God creates 
within the agent, causing him to perform a 
particular act of obedience to the exclusion 
of any other act, and khidhln as a capacity 
for a particular act of disobedience.
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Fay
Fay in classical legal thought is usually 
the collective wealth of Muslims derived 
from the taxation of conquered peoples. 
Fay revenue is contrasted, on the one 
hand, with ghanma, spoils taken through 
battle, and, on the other, with adaqa (or 
zakt), alms paid by the Muslims them-
selves. The fay is usually to be redistrib-
uted to Muslim fighters as an a (stipend) 
and sometimes for other public purposes 
(mali).
The verb fa and associated terms 
have the basic meaning of “return.” The 
evidence of the Qurn and pre-Islamic 
poetry suggests that derivatives of the root 
were used in connection with the taking 
of spoils in war in pre-Islamic Arabia 
(Q 33:50, 59:6, 7; Imru al-Qays, 211). 
The classical Islamic distinction between 
“spoils” and “revenue” began to take 
shape during the development of the first 
Muslim empire, in the first/seventh and 
second/eighth centuries. By the mid-sec-
ond/eighth century the policy of distrib-
uting to the conquerors not conquered 
land but only the revenue from that land 
had become widespread, with the result 
that “spoils” ( ghanma) were distinguished 
from “collective wealth,” or “revenue” 
( fay). However, the more general sense 
of “spoils” did not disappear completely 
after the 100s/720s (Simonsen, 141–2; cf. 
Morimoto, 139–44).
Contests among Muslims over the 
resources of the early empire generated 
many of the internal conflicts of the first/
seventh and second/eighth centuries, and 
abuse of the fay is the subject of recur-
rent complaints attributed to groups dis-
satisfied with their place in the new elite. 
Al-usayn (d. 61/680) is said to have 
accused the Umayyads of “claiming exclu-
sive possession of the fay  ” (al-abar, 
2:300). Fair distribution of the fay is said 
to have been one of the principles upon 
which Zayd b. Al’s (d. 122/740) follow-
ers pledged allegiance (al-abar, 2:1687). 
Conversely, those holding power are said 
to have invoked the fay as a right to be 
defended against rebels: in 66/685 the 
Qurash Ibn Mu warned his supporters 
that the followers of the rebel al-Mukhtr 
